Learn What pH Stands For and How the Term Originated

Realize What pH Stands For and How the Term Originated Have you at any point thought about a big motivator for pH or where the term began? Here is the response to the inquiry and a glance at the historical backdrop of the pH scale. Key Takeaways: Origin of pH Term pH represents intensity of hydrogen.The H is promoted on the grounds that it is the hydrogen component symbol.pH is a proportion of how acidic or essential a watery arrangement is. It is determined as the negative logarithm of hydrogen particle fixation. pH Definition and Origin pH is the negative log of hydrogen particle focus in a water-based arrangement. The term pH was first portrayed by Danish organic chemist Sã ¸ren Peter Lauritz Sã ¸rensen in 1909. pH is a shortened form for intensity of hydrogen where p is short for the German word for power, potenz and H is the component image for hydrogen. The H is promoted on the grounds that it is standard to underwrite component images. The shortening likewise works in French, with pouvoir hydrogen interpreting as the intensity of hydrogen. Logarithmic Scale The pH scale is a logarithmic scale that normally runs from 1 to 14. Every entire pH esteem beneath 7 (the pH of unadulterated water) is multiple times more acidic than the higher worth and every entire pH esteem over 7 is multiple times less acidic than the one underneath it. For instance, a pH of 3 is multiple times more acidic than a pH of 4 and multiple times (multiple times 10) more acidic than a pH estimation of 5. In this way, a solid corrosive may have a pH of 1-2, while a solid base may have a pH of 13-14. A pH almost 7 is viewed as impartial. Condition for pH pH is the logarithm of the hydrogen particle convergence of a watery (water-based) arrangement: pH - log[H] log is the base 10 logarithm and [H] is hydrogen particle focus in the units moles per liter Its imperative to remember an answer must be watery to have a pH. You can't, for instance, count pH of vegetable oil or unadulterated ethanol. What Is the pH of Stomach Acid? | Can You Have Negative pH? Sources Bates, Roger G.â (1973). Assurance of pH: Theory and Practice. Wiley.Covington, A. K.; Bates, R. G.; Durst, R. A. (1985). Meanings of pH scales, standard reference esteems, estimation of pH, and related wording (PDF). Unadulterated Appl. Chem. 57 (3): 531â€542. doi:10.1351/pac198557030531

Edgar Allan Poes Tell Tale Heart and Sir Arthur Conan Doyles The Adve

Edgar Allan Poe's Tell Tale Heart and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's The Adventure of the Speckled Band Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Edgar Allan Poe, the two creators who are famous for the substance of their accounts, expounded on wrongdoing. However they created stories concerning wrongdoing, the two of them composed through alternate points of view. This paper is going to look at how the characters of the two stories, 'Obvious Heart' composed by Poe, and 'The Experience of the Speckled Band' composed by Doyle, have been depicted diversely by their creators just as investigating into the language style of the two stories. The verifiable foundations of the two creators have impacted the way their accounts are composed. Poe apparently had a flimsy life as his mom kicked the bucket at and early age of three, and after that he was taken into a cultivate home of John Allan. He was instructed at the University of Virginia. Later he went through a squabble with his temporary dad and left home. He served in the U.S. Armed force under a bogus name, Edgar A. Perry, and off base age and afterward went to West Point from 1830 to 1831 yet got himself excused when he understood he could never be accommodated with his non-permanent dad. He composed Gothic books, which is a sort of fiction, written in response to eighteenth c realism, that recovers secret and licenses outrageous feelings. His third volume of verse brought him neither popularity nor benefit yet in 1833 he won a prize for best short story. From 1844, he settled down in New York as a manager what not this while he was increasing some notoriety for his short stories, sonnets, audits, and expositions, such stories as The Fall of the House of Usher (1839), Murders in the Rue Morgue (1841), and The Gold bug (1843), would later be respect... ...e of the Speckled Band,' it could be seen that they both follow an equation based plot, yet the creators highlight on various portions of the plot, for example, the issue or advancement, in various extents, either underlining pretty much on it. For instance, Poe underlines the self-fanatical activities and sentiments of the hero in the advancement more than the others, though Doyle stresses more on the issue, which is talked about between the customer and Holmes. In Doyle's accounts there are numerous characters, which are noteworthy in the plot in their own particular manner, for example, Holmes, Watson, the convict and the casualty, while in Poe's accounts the hero is the person in question himself. The language is unpredictable, in the two stories, from their own purpose of perspectives, but since of Holmes' sensible thinking behind everything and Poe's self-over the top activities, it doesn't appear to be so.

The 5 Stages of a Successful Customer Life Cycle - Focus

The 5 Stages of a Successful Customer Life Cycle - Focus Designing a customer life cycle can be daunting. After all, sourcing people who are totally new to your brand and turning them into loyal customers, and even brand advocates, is no easy feat. However,  with a customer cycle jam-packed with visual content and engaging challenges, disseminated via  Facebook and Google ads, customers can be won-over. To attract  new clients to my digital marketing agency, I move customers through the following five key stages: Awareness Acquisition Conversion Retention Loyalty In this article, Ill share how I deliver this five stage customer life cycle, with the assistance of Facebook ads, Google Ads, and  MindMeister. The 5 Stages of a Customer Life Cycle As mentioned, the most popular  customer life cycle journeys include a variation of Awareness, Acquisition, Conversion, Retention, and Loyalty.   I’m going to start by creating a mind map in MindMeister, mapping  out the five main stages of my customer life cycle: For each of the topics, I’m going to develop the creatives, goals, and targeting specs for both Google and Facebook. With  MindMeister, you can embed your campaign collaterals directly into the mind map. For example, you can attach a campaign creative to the relevant topic, or link directly to a Google Sheet, where you document the results of each cycle stage: For now, lets return to the five steps: 1. Awareness After I’ve installed retargeting pixels for both Google Adwords and Facebook to my site, I’m going to set up two ads. These ads feature a video introducing myself, explaining how I serve the clientele in my defined demographic. Tip: You can check FB audience insights to grab this data on the best demographics to target. Access it in your FB business manager at business.facebook.com The reason I want to employ Google Ads, specifically video ads, is that I’m not attempting to send people to my website or make a purchase. At this  Awareness stage, Im simply using ads for outreach. I want people to know that my agency exists and become accustomed to the brand.   As a result, I’ve created a YouTube ad that will run before videos with a similar target audience, enabling me to access their viewers. Additionally, this ad will show up as a sponsored link when people search for keywords related to the video, extending my reach. Ill also install a tracking code on my website, to collect the data from these YouTube ads and Google traffic. This means that if people are on YouTube, but not yet in my realm of Facebook targeting, I can use the data to form my Website Custom Audience traffic on Facebook. Using this tactic, Ive developed two potential touch points for introducing new customers to my brand. Step 1 Awareness: Implement a YouTube ad on channels with a similar target audience, in order to outreach to new customers and develop brand awareness. Then, collate leads to retarget with Facebook ads. Map out your campaign with MindMeister Get Started Its free! Get Started 2. Acquisition In the acquisition stage, Ill be using my  Out There October  challenge to acquire clients. This lead-generation campaign invites potential customers to sign-up free and download the #outtherechallenge activity chart. The chart helps businesses position themselves for new clients, opportunities, and profits, so the challenge is aimed at engaging business owners. By offering free expert advice with the chart, I can prove myself as an expert, while collecting client leads from the sign-up forms. Building on the awareness and traffic from the previous stage, where I focused on YouTube  publishers related to my brand  and developing Facebook leads, I’ve been able to create two ads for my Out There October campaign: For Facebook, I’m going to show the Out There October advertisement to people who viewed my Facebook ads in the previous week. On YouTube, I’ll place my  Out There October ads on related YouTube channels,  and as a sponsored result for a specific search. My goal for doing this is to take people who have seen the ads and move them into a challenge, allowing them to engage a little deeper with my brand. This step is not quite conversion, but moving through this step helps to build the  know and like factor.  It’s warming them up to trust me and priming them for a purchase that I’d like them to make in a later step. Step 2 Acquisition: Create a challenge that offers quality, expert advice and encourages your audience to engage. Then, promote the challenge to your target audience and generate leads. 3. Conversion For conversions, I wanted to show my ads to folks that have: already engaged with my page visited my website engaged with my ads to the point that they’ve watched 75% of the video ad or have opted into my challenge. At this point, I want to convert them into clients by signing them up for a webinar that will nurture them with valuable marketing tips. The webinar will also announce an offer for a course that they can purchase at a special BETA price, exclusively for webinar attendees. Step 3 Conversion: Invite your acquired leads to an informative free webinar and offer an exclusive discount on a service related to the webinar topic. 4. Retention My retention stage involves promoting  former case studies  to: people who engaged in the previous opt-in steps and people who have made a purchase. For those who already purchased the course, the case studies help to ensure they wont feel buyers remorse. Additionally, the targeted case studies provide  social proof  to people who have expressed interest, by engaging in the former opt-in steps, but havent yet made a purchase.   Even if customers dont make a purchase at this stage, they can still be retained and retargeted with ads for future product launches. Step 4 Retention: Promote customer success stories to keep previous customers interested and provide social proof to those yet to purchase. 5. Loyalty At this level, we want people to love us. We want to be thought of as a household brand and for customers to become ecstatic advocates. Perks help, so I’m going to roll out an affiliate program to get those who’ve purchased the course, or who are at least fans or subscribers, to share my products with their friends. I’ll share this opportunity with customers who have engaged with my brand in some way over the previous four steps, and with my marketing email list. Hopefully, as loyal customers share their stories, this will bring new people into the awareness phase,  helping to create a new loop for people coming into contact with my brand. Step 5 Loyalty: Launch an affiliate program to turn happy customers into advocates, creating a new customer life cycle. Here’s how my five-stage customer life cycle mind map turned out, as I worked through the final steps of my Facebook and Google Ads: What’s great is that at each level, I have the opportunity to A/B test ads. This enables me to  see whether my assumptions about how ads move people through my customer life cycle are true. As a result, I now have a plan to create a pipeline of leads, sales and returning customers, all through the effective use of paid ads and MindMeister. Map out your campaign with MindMeister Get Started Its free! Get Started At MeisterLabs, we’re always excited to hear about the positive impact that  MindMeister  and  MeisterTask  are having on businesses. If you have a story to share about how youre using MindMeister and/or MeisterTask, we’d love to hear from you! To get in touch about being featured on our blog, drop Olivia an email at  olivia (at) meisterlabs (dot) com The 5 Stages of a Successful Customer Life Cycle - Focus Designing a customer life cycle can be daunting. After all, sourcing people who are totally new to your brand and turning them into loyal customers, and even brand advocates, is no easy feat. However,  with a customer cycle jam-packed with visual content and engaging challenges, disseminated via  Facebook and Google ads, customers can be won-over. To attract  new clients to my digital marketing agency, I move customers through the following five key stages: Awareness Acquisition Conversion Retention Loyalty In this article, Ill share how I deliver this five stage customer life cycle, with the assistance of Facebook ads, Google Ads, and  MindMeister. The 5 Stages of a Customer Life Cycle As mentioned, the most popular  customer life cycle journeys include a variation of Awareness, Acquisition, Conversion, Retention, and Loyalty.   I’m going to start by creating a mind map in MindMeister, mapping  out the five main stages of my customer life cycle: For each of the topics, I’m going to develop the creatives, goals, and targeting specs for both Google and Facebook. With  MindMeister, you can embed your campaign collaterals directly into the mind map. For example, you can attach a campaign creative to the relevant topic, or link directly to a Google Sheet, where you document the results of each cycle stage: For now, lets return to the five steps: 1. Awareness After I’ve installed retargeting pixels for both Google Adwords and Facebook to my site, I’m going to set up two ads. These ads feature a video introducing myself, explaining how I serve the clientele in my defined demographic. Tip: You can check FB audience insights to grab this data on the best demographics to target. Access it in your FB business manager at business.facebook.com The reason I want to employ Google Ads, specifically video ads, is that I’m not attempting to send people to my website or make a purchase. At this  Awareness stage, Im simply using ads for outreach. I want people to know that my agency exists and become accustomed to the brand.   As a result, I’ve created a YouTube ad that will run before videos with a similar target audience, enabling me to access their viewers. Additionally, this ad will show up as a sponsored link when people search for keywords related to the video, extending my reach. Ill also install a tracking code on my website, to collect the data from these YouTube ads and Google traffic. This means that if people are on YouTube, but not yet in my realm of Facebook targeting, I can use the data to form my Website Custom Audience traffic on Facebook. Using this tactic, Ive developed two potential touch points for introducing new customers to my brand. Step 1 Awareness: Implement a YouTube ad on channels with a similar target audience, in order to outreach to new customers and develop brand awareness. Then, collate leads to retarget with Facebook ads. Map out your campaign with MindMeister Get Started Its free! Get Started 2. Acquisition In the acquisition stage, Ill be using my  Out There October  challenge to acquire clients. This lead-generation campaign invites potential customers to sign-up free and download the #outtherechallenge activity chart. The chart helps businesses position themselves for new clients, opportunities, and profits, so the challenge is aimed at engaging business owners. By offering free expert advice with the chart, I can prove myself as an expert, while collecting client leads from the sign-up forms. Building on the awareness and traffic from the previous stage, where I focused on YouTube  publishers related to my brand  and developing Facebook leads, I’ve been able to create two ads for my Out There October campaign: For Facebook, I’m going to show the Out There October advertisement to people who viewed my Facebook ads in the previous week. On YouTube, I’ll place my  Out There October ads on related YouTube channels,  and as a sponsored result for a specific search. My goal for doing this is to take people who have seen the ads and move them into a challenge, allowing them to engage a little deeper with my brand. This step is not quite conversion, but moving through this step helps to build the  know and like factor.  It’s warming them up to trust me and priming them for a purchase that I’d like them to make in a later step. Step 2 Acquisition: Create a challenge that offers quality, expert advice and encourages your audience to engage. Then, promote the challenge to your target audience and generate leads. 3. Conversion For conversions, I wanted to show my ads to folks that have: already engaged with my page visited my website engaged with my ads to the point that they’ve watched 75% of the video ad or have opted into my challenge. At this point, I want to convert them into clients by signing them up for a webinar that will nurture them with valuable marketing tips. The webinar will also announce an offer for a course that they can purchase at a special BETA price, exclusively for webinar attendees. Step 3 Conversion: Invite your acquired leads to an informative free webinar and offer an exclusive discount on a service related to the webinar topic. 4. Retention My retention stage involves promoting  former case studies  to: people who engaged in the previous opt-in steps and people who have made a purchase. For those who already purchased the course, the case studies help to ensure they wont feel buyers remorse. Additionally, the targeted case studies provide  social proof  to people who have expressed interest, by engaging in the former opt-in steps, but havent yet made a purchase.   Even if customers dont make a purchase at this stage, they can still be retained and retargeted with ads for future product launches. Step 4 Retention: Promote customer success stories to keep previous customers interested and provide social proof to those yet to purchase. 5. Loyalty At this level, we want people to love us. We want to be thought of as a household brand and for customers to become ecstatic advocates. Perks help, so I’m going to roll out an affiliate program to get those who’ve purchased the course, or who are at least fans or subscribers, to share my products with their friends. I’ll share this opportunity with customers who have engaged with my brand in some way over the previous four steps, and with my marketing email list. Hopefully, as loyal customers share their stories, this will bring new people into the awareness phase,  helping to create a new loop for people coming into contact with my brand. Step 5 Loyalty: Launch an affiliate program to turn happy customers into advocates, creating a new customer life cycle. Here’s how my five-stage customer life cycle mind map turned out, as I worked through the final steps of my Facebook and Google Ads: What’s great is that at each level, I have the opportunity to A/B test ads. This enables me to  see whether my assumptions about how ads move people through my customer life cycle are true. As a result, I now have a plan to create a pipeline of leads, sales and returning customers, all through the effective use of paid ads and MindMeister. Map out your campaign with MindMeister Get Started Its free! Get Started At MeisterLabs, we’re always excited to hear about the positive impact that  MindMeister  and  MeisterTask  are having on businesses. If you have a story to share about how youre using MindMeister and/or MeisterTask, we’d love to hear from you! To get in touch about being featured on our blog, drop Olivia an email at  olivia (at) meisterlabs (dot) com

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. - 1589 Words

On August 28, 1963 at the Lincoln Memorial 250,000 people gathered after the March on Washington. This is where Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. addressed the nation with his â€Å"I Have a Dream† speech. He was speaking out about the injustices of segregation, and discrimination of African Americans that was happening in America. This speech is one of the most famous in America’s history to demonstrate the freedom our nation was built upon. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s speeches and demonstrations would provoke movement in the hearts of the American people. He persuaded and inspired a nation into action with his words. With this speech, he masterfully uses ethos, pathos, logos, inductive, and deductive reasoning to convince all Americans that racism†¦show more content†¦An example of deductive reasoning in this speech is in the fourth paragraph when he says, â€Å"This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed t he ‘unalienable rights’ of ‘Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’† (King, 1963, para. 4) In this argument, he emphasizes the fact that the Declaration of Independence states that black men are also men. Therefore, logically, they should be given the same rights that white men get. Another example of deductive reasoning is all throughout paragraph six when King is explaining that now is the time for change in the country (King, 1963, para. 6). He is logically going from the general picture of â€Å"Now is the time to make justice a reality,† (King, 1963, para. 6) to small conclusions on why this change needs to happen. Using this type of reasoning allows King to supply sufficient evidence to his claims and therefore add logos to his speech. In fact, the use of either inductive or deductive reasoning adds to the logos if a speech. Logos is a rhetorical device that is used to get the audience to believe the speaker because what the speaker is saying is logical and there is evidence to support the conclusion. An example of logos in this speech is when he states, â€Å"America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds’† (King, 1963, para. 4). This analogy is using logic as a form of reasoning. He reasoning is that everyone has aShow MoreRelatedDr. Martin Luther King Jr.658 Words   |  3 PagesIndividual Project Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. inspired myself along with many other nationalities all over the world in so many ways. He was a very courageous and intelligent man who fought so hard for the blacks or African-Americans like myself to have equal rights like the whites or Caucasian people. Just as other civil rights leaders such as Rosa Parks, Dr. King felt that it just wasn’t fair that the black people was segregatedRead MoreDr. Martin Luther King Jr. Essay871 Words   |  4 Pages Dr. Martin Luther King Jr was born in Atlanta Georgia on January 15, 1929. His parents were Reverend Martin Luther King Sr. and Alberta Williams King. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and his siblings were guided by the spiritual teachings from their father and attended public schools in Atlanta during their childhood. King and his nine siblings grew up in a financially secure middle class family. They received a better education than the average child of their race, King noticed this and it influencedRead MoreMartin Luther King Jr. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is unarguably the most famous civil rights900 Words   |  4 Pages Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is unarguably the most famous civil rights activist in American history. His story and legacy is taught in classrooms across the country. From birth to death, Dr. King impacted the lives of many people and changed the roles of society forever. Dr. King had one big dream and what shaped his dream begins in Atlanta,, Georgia, and ends in Memphis, Tennessee. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was born into a loving and caring family on January 15, 1929 inRead More Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Essay2605 Words   |  11 Pages Martin Luther King Jr. King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929-1968), American clergyman and Nobel Prize winner, one of the principal leaders of the American civil rights movement and a prominent advocate of nonviolent protest. Kingamp;#8217;s challenges to segregation and racial discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s helped convince many white Americans to support the cause of civil rights in the United States. After his assassination in 1968, King became a symbol of protest in the struggle for racialRead MoreEssay on Leadership Skills of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.823 Words   |  4 PagesDr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Abstract This paper will analyze and study the legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King and how leadership skills helped him in accomplishing his goals. The characteristics that made Dr. King a great leader will also be addressed. By studying great leaders, insight can be gained into what qualities they possess. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was a vital figure of the modern era. His lectures and dialogues stirred the concern and sparked theRead MoreMy Hero: Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Essay542 Words   |  3 Pagesall portray some kind of heroic abilities. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is one the most heroic figures of our time. According to Joseph Campbells characteristics Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. has a characteristic of a hero such as, a hero is usually someone from whom something has been taken or who feels theres something lacking in the normal experience available, or permitted, to members of his society. (The Power of Myth, 1998) Dr. Martin Luther King was a man who yearned for dignity and respectRead More The Rhetoric of Pathos in the Writings of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.1141 Words   |  5 PagesThe Rhetoric of Pathos in the Writings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. I have a dream, says Dr. Samuel Proctor, Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor Emeritus of Rutgers University. All the little children--you hear everywhere you go: I have a dream. All the little children repeating that speech. Its become like the Star Spangled Banner or the Pledge of Allegiance. Its entered our culture. And so it has: I have a dream has become one of the most memorable phrases of the twentieth centuryRead MoreDr. Martin Luther King, Jr.s Fight Essay1059 Words   |  5 PagesDr. Martin Luther King, Jr.s Fight Throughout history there have been times when citizens have had the need, as well as the responsibility, to violate certain societal rules/laws in order to protest against unjust treatment and bring about social or political change. It began as early as Socrates, who disobeyed an unjust decree against teaching his ideas, which led to his being condemned to death; Mahatma Gandhi’s fight against British rule over India; and Rosa Parks refusal to give up her seatRead MoreEssay about Biography of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.4067 Words   |  17 PagesBiography of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Jan. 15, 1929 - April 4, 1968 Nationality: American Occupation: civil rights leader Occupation: minister (religion) Michael King Jr. was born on January 15, 1929, in the Atlanta home of his maternal grandfather, Adam Daniel Williams (1863 — 1931). He was the second child and the first son of Michael King Sr. (1897 — 1984) and Alberta Christine Williams King (1903 — 1974). Michael Jr. had an older sister, Willie Christine (b. 1927), and a youngerRead MoreEssay on Dr. Martin Luther King Jr and The Civil Rights Movement2125 Words   |  9 PagesMartin Luther King jr. was one of the most influential persons of the 20th Century. He is the father of the modern civil rights movement, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., is recognized around the world as a symbol of freedom as well as peace. King practiced everything that he preached, he did not preach or speak values that he himself did not follow. He established himself as a pastor that was not afraid of hard work, guiding the middle-class congregation to public service. For example, Peake, Thomas

Freedom Of Speech By Ann Griffin - 924 Words

Freedom of speech is a constitutional right that all of us hold dear, everyone uses it daily or not at all in some cases. Teachers however use it just as much, and there have been quite a few court cases establishing what rights to free speech teachers have. Examining the pros and cons of this situation regarding Ann Griffin was dismissed based on concerns from a statement regarding African-Americans and how the court should rule in this case. In the first proof the argument for her dismissal on the basis that she would not be able to treat others fairly based on what she said. Secondly, being that she would not be able to work effectively with her colleagues. On the other spectrum of the argument, her right to free speech and what are the limits regarding her free speech as a teacher? While finally coming down to her right to an opinion with her free speech in that workspace. Tying together what is ultimately the ruling on her case. Initially, in the dismissal of Ann Griffin, from her comment that she â€Å"Hated all black folks† it brought about evident items from such speech. These items leading to further discrimination of students stemming off the statement she made. Leading to one of the reasons she was dismissed from her job from the principal. The statement she made was one of public concern as it advocated that she would possibly discriminate. Example of this in Daniels V. Quinn, it is judged that if a teacher makes a statement about public concern, it can viewedShow MoreRelatedAnalysis Of Freddie Watts And Jimmy Brothers998 Words   |  4 Pageswhen Ann Griffin made a racial comment. Watts and Brothers administered a primarily African American school. Ann Griffin is a Caucasian teacher who made a racial remark to the principle, Freddie Watts, and vice principal, Jimmy Brothers, of the school she was administered to. 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These structures have large implications for educational and curriculum issues (Griffin Case, 1997; Kalchman Case, 1998; Case, Griffin, Kelly, 1999). Vygotsky’s Theory Like Piaget, Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) also believed that children actively construct their knowledge. Vygotsky was born in Russia in the same year as Piaget was born, but died much youngerRead MoreRastafarian79520 Words   |  319 Pagesrationalization and charismatic eruption operate in dynamic tension. Thoroughgoing rationalization, which Weber believes has become characteristic of Western society, will solidify into an iron cage, which robs people of their intuition, creativity, and freedom;22 and charismatic eruption, without routinization (a rationalizing process), will be an eminently transitory phenomenon having no lasting effect on social change.23 Therefore, according to Weber, the evolution of cultural and social systems turnsRead MoreEssay about Phd Comprehensive Exam. in Leadership15004 Words   |  61 Pagesserve as an impetus for cultural change as the method explores dynamic systems and processes often unrevealed through traditional studies† (Gerdes Conn, 2001). A prime example of such a study was the memoir Black Like Me by journalist John Howard Griffin first published in 1961. It recounted the trials of an African American male during the late 1950s in the American South. 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With this knowledge and ethical approach has come empowerment of professionals with increased authority and more freedom to be creative. This also enables the ability to diffuse ideas that encourage change and improvement across information services boundaries. A common aspiration, the vision, which will be discussed in more detail under strategic planning, can formRead MoreFundamentals of Hrm263904 Words   |  1056 PagesMembership 343 Dissatisfaction with Management 345 Labor Legislation 346 The Wagner Act 346 The Taft-Hartley Act 346 Other Laws Affecting Labor-Management Relations 347 DIVERSITY ISSUES IN HRM: Unions and EEO 348 The Railway Labor Act of 1926 348 Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 348 Executive Orders 10988 and 11491 348 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of 1970 349 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 349 Labor-Management Cooperation 358 Public Sector Unionization 359 Unionizing the NontraditionalRead MoreMonsanto: Better Living Through Genetic Engineering96204 Words   |  385 Pagesfrom a hearing aid because it helps to compensate for damaged or non-functional parts of the ear, while a hearing aid ampliï ¬ es sound for a partially functioning ear. The implant has four parts: a tiny but sensitive microphone that picks up sound a speech processor that selects and arranges useful sounds a transmitter and receiver that turns these sounds into electrical impulses a series of electrodes that are surgically implanted in the inner ear, which pick up the receiver’s impulses and transmitRead MoreHuman Resources Management150900 Words   |  604 Pagesindustry each year and 300,000 switch jobs within the industry. Increasingly tight deadlines, only five hours of sleep per night, and employer monitoring of rigs on the road by satellite make drivers less satisfied with jobs that used to appeal to freedom-loving â€Å"knights of the road.† With the increased demand for drivers has come the inevitable upward pressure on wages. Starting annual salaries average $34,000 and many companies pay $55,000 or above for experienced drivers. Special retention bonuses

Discussion on Organ Donation Shortage Free Essays

Medicine has evolved since the days of bloodletting, but from the perspective of a waiting recipient on the organ donor list, we still live in the dark ages. With a list of 110,941 hopeful candidates for organ transplant, the status of organ donation as a taboo subject in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) has left an average of 20 people dead each day. (1) The high demand and low supply has led to creative solutions from both medical and government sectors, but what’s the answer? Is government intervention necessary, or should the fed keep their laws off my liver? While the fourth annual National Donor Designation Report Card prepared by Donate Life America shows 94. We will write a custom essay sample on Discussion on Organ Donation Shortage or any similar topic only for you Order Now 7 million people were enrolled in state donor registries at the end of 2010,(2) it still doesn’t address the need that exists today. The shortage of organ donors in the U. S. is a problem. There are many factors that lie behind the reasons for shortage. From socioeconomic and demographic factors to religious beliefs, candidates just aren’t surfacing like they could. (3) â€Å"All the doctors and nurses I know are donors,† says Dr. Joshua Gitter, a practicing M. D. at John Muir Medical Center in Walnut Creek, California. â€Å"We can’t be the only ones providing organs here, ya know? The general public needs to step up. † The reason organs are in chronically short supply is partly due to the U. S. policy that requires voluntary giving. Dr. Gitter says most organs for transplant come from accident victims, who become brain dead after serious head injuries. These victims are typically put on life-support, and the next of kin’s consent is required to turn off the machine and donate the organs. Dr. Gitter says there are usually good chances of receiving donations from the families of accident victims, but each case changes on a family by family basis. Studies have shown the chances of donation from families who had prior knowledge of the patients’ wishes regarding donation have a higher rate of donation from the ICU,(4) but how often does mortality come up in a healthy conversation with family? Craig Gammel, a San Jose resident says he never had a conversation with his family members on the topic of organ donation, so when his father suffered a brain aneurism in the summer of 2009, Mr. Gammel possessed no pre determined ideas of donating his fathers organs during his drive to the ICU where his father waited in a coma. â€Å"You’re never ready for a call like that. † Says Mr. Gammel, reflecting on the day he got the call about his father’s aneurism. â€Å"We didn’t wait long before the doctors confirmed my father was brain dead. † Craig made the decision to take his father off life support after hearing the news, and agreed to donate his fathers hazel eyes to a waiting recipient. When the nurse initially approached Mr. Gammel with the request for eye donation, she did so in a tentative and reserved manner. Craig says he appreciated the way the topic was introduced, and grateful for the opportunity to assist another person in need. â€Å"Of course I wanted his death to at least help someone. † He said. â€Å"The old man would have wanted the same, I think. † Craig says he wouldn’t have thought about organ donation at the time if the nurse hadn’t asked him. Since organ transplant candidates cannot rely solely on these cases, the concept of mandated choice was proposed by the American Medical Association in 1994. 5) Mandated choice would make it so people are required by law to state in advance whether or not they will be an organ donor. The American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs supports mandated choice. In a 1994 report, the council said: â€Å"Requiring a decision regarding donation would overcome a major obstacle to organ donation – the reluctance of individuals to contemplate their own deaths and the disposition of their bodies. †(6) â€Å"Frankly, I’m shocked that people need the government to tell them plan for their mortality. I wouldn’t want to be brain dead and have my family refuse organ donation because I never told them I wanted to donate. It’s tantamount to being buried with your money. Donate it for Christ sakes. † Concluded Craig. However, everyone does not share this belief of Craig’s. â€Å"I would never allow my daughters body to be chopped up and shared like a joint at a doobie brothers concert. † Said Santa Barbara resident David Martin when asked if he would donate the organs of a family member in the unlikely event of their sudden or accidental death. David’s cited his strict belief in Christian Science as support. His decision to abstain from all medical practices and remedies is a cornerstone in the religion, making the concept of organ donation implausible. While David’s beliefs are of a minority opinion, it still reflects a refusal to donate healthy organs to dying people. With factors influencing donation ranging from family or patient attitudes and beliefs to deaths from trauma being the decision factors, it’s hard to come up with a method for determining the right time to approach a family. â€Å"We have been trained to approach the subject with as much care and tact as possible. † Says Hillary Gitter, a practicing nurse at John Muir Medical Center. You’d be surprised how many people are open to the request if you approach them at the right time and in the right tone. † Because Hillary interacts with patients that are waiting for organ transplants, she firmly believes the need trumps any social awkwardness that arises when asking for organ donations. â⠂¬Å"How would you look someone in the eyes and say their chance of finding a donor is slim to none? You’ve sealed their fate and dashed all hope with that fact, so you do what you can to help people get donors. I think even false hope is better than a death sentence. † Said Hilary. How to cite Discussion on Organ Donation Shortage, Papers

Collective Strategy Development free essay sample

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John Wiley Sons is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Strategic Management Journal. http://www. jstor. org Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 375-385 (1988) AND COMPETITIVE MATCHING COLLECTIVE RUDIK. F. BRESSER Baruch College, The City University of New York,New York,New York,U. S. A. This paper discusses possibilities for combining collective and competitive strategies. Combinations can be problematic if competitive intentions are disclosed through the information links resultingfrom collective strategies. After describing how different collective strategies may lead to an uncontrolled disclosure of strategic information, a typology evaluating the feasibility of strategy combinations is developed. The typologys implications for research and managerial practice are discussed. A recent development in the business policy literature is a concern with strategic planning at a collective level. Collective strategies are attempts by sets of organizations to manage their mutural interdependence and the system dynamics of their interorganizational environments (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Thorelli, 1986). In managing interdependent and dynamic environments, collective strategies can be reactive by absorbing movement within an environment, or they can be proactive by forestalling the unpredictable behavior of other organizations. Firms can use collective strategies in combination with competitive strategies. This paper discusses the extent to which such combinations are feasible. MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCE Organizational interdependence exists whenever one organization does not entirely control all the conditions necessary for achieving a desired action or outcome (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In addition to environmental movement, interdependence can cause problems of decision-making uncertainty for focal organizations. This occurs because the success of activities chosen by any interdependent organization depends on the activities selected by other organizations. Consequently, an interdependent organization may need to consider other organizations actions, and it faces decision-making uncertainty if it is aware of its interdependence and has difficulties in controlling the activities of other organizations. Decision-making uncertainty is most likely to be perceived among horizontally interdependent organizations operating in oligopolistic markets. Under these conditions all organizations are aware of their mutual interdependence and have considerable difficulties in controlling each others behaviors as they compete with one another for market share (Fombrun and Astley, 1982; Pennings, 1981). Business firms can use both competitive and collective strategies to manage their interdependencies. The literature distinguishes three major dimensions of competitive strategies: price, promotional, and product competition strategies (Khandwalla, 1981). Competitive strategies manage interdependence successfully if they result in advantageous competitive positions, thus forestalling interdependence and reducing decisionmaking uncertainty (Pennings, 1981). For Received 20 October 1986 Revised 21 July 1987 ? 0143-2095/88/040375-11$05. 50 1988 by John Wiley Sons, Ltd. 376 R. K. F. Bresser Table 1. Coordination mechanisms for collective strategies Coordination mechanism Regulative legislation Contracting Mergers Joint ventures Interlocking directorates Trade associations Collusion and industry leadership Degree of formalization High High High High Moderate Moderate Low instance, product differentiation can create a protected domain for a focal organization with boundaries hard to penetrate by other competitors. However, in complex business environments interdependencies often are obscured from focal organizations so that individually coping with the dynamics of these environments becomes problematic (Emery and Trist, 1965). In these situations, collective strategies can supplement competitive strategies as a means of coping with the variation of interdependent environments (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a). CONCEPTIONS STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COMPETITIVE AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES Bresser and Harl (1986) described the dynamic relationship between competitive and collective strategies as being composed of two strategic perspectives that are dialectically related to one another. For instance, when competitive strategies prevail within a market the resulting turbulence and decision-making uncertainty eventually will encourage organizations to use more collective forms of strategizing. However, when collective strategies prevail and create dysfunctions (such as reductions in strategic flexibility, amplified impacts of external disturbances, and attraction of innovative outsiders) which also cause environmental movement and decision-making uncertainty, competitive strategies may again be considered the more attractive methods for coping with interdependence. The dialectical relationship between competitive and collective strategies implies that organizations should remain alert to potential dysfunctions developing from their operating strategies, and that they should maintain a capacity to alternate between more collective and more competitive forms of strategizing (Bresser and Harl, 1986). However, some conflicts between competitive and collective strategies can be anticipated and should be considered before a particular strategy mix is adopted. This paper evaluates combinations between competitive and collective strategies in light of a potential conflict arising from the need to both share and conceal strategic information. Whenever organizations attempt to use both types of strategies simultaneously, i. e. competitive The term collective strategy has been defined in two different ways (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986). On the one hand a collective strategy is defined as a larger interorganizational network which emerges unintendedly. As individual organizational actions aggregate into interorganizational networks an unintended collective strategy emerges that none of the participating organizations could have foreseen. Developments in the telecommunications industry exemplify the emergence of an unintended collective strategy (Astley and Fombrun, 1983b). On the other hand a collective strategy can also be voluntary and intended. Such a collective strategy results from the purposive collaboration of organizations attempting to manage their mutual interdependence. This paper focuses on voluntary collective strategies, developed by oligopolists to manage their horizontal interdependence. Voluntary collective strategies can be based on different coordination mechanisms. Table 1 presents these mechanisms using degree of formalization as the distinguishing criterion (Bresser and Harl, 1986; Fombrun and Astley, 1983). Regulative legislation (resulting from collective lobbying) and contracting represent coordination forms with high levels of formality. Collective strategies based on interlocking directorates or trade associations are characterized by moderate levels of formality, and collusion as well as industry leadership can be classified as informal coordination mechanisms. Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies strategies in one business area and collective strategies in others, a potential for contradictory activities or conflicts arises, because the major advantage of a collective strategy is a major disadvantage from a competitive point of view. With regard to managing interdependence the major advantage of a collective strategy is that it establishes linkages and communication channels through which information about other interdependent organizations can be obtained. Through this information the behavior of other organizations becomes predictable. This makes an environment more stable and less threatening for a focal organization, and thus reduces decision-making uncertainty (Fombrun and Astley, 1983; Pennings, 1981). Precisely this advantage of a collective strategy (stability through predictability) is a disadvantage if organizations wish to use competitive strategies to further their growth goals. Successful competitive strategies require that organizations maintain the secrecy of their strategic plans to forestall imitation (Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). However, this need for secrecy is jeopardized if interorganizational linkages and communication channels resulting from a collective strategy allow organizations to predict and anticipate one anothers moves in areas where they wish to compete. Thus, organizations face a risk of uncontrolled information disclosure when using collective and competitive strategies side by side. Risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is defined as the likelihood that a disclosure of strategically sensitive information will occur, where the process of disclosue is uncontrolled from a focal organizations point of view and damaging to its competitive plans. The potential damage resulting from an uncontrolled disclosure of information is particularly salient in oligopolies (the dominant US market structure) because in such markets ompetitors typically are in a position to use sensitive information to exert control over each others fates (Pennings, 1981; Scherer, 1980). Evaluating the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure emanating from collective strategies is important for two reasons. On the one hand, such information disclosure tends to render competitive strategic intentions ineffective. On the other hand uncontrolled information di sclosure tends to aggravate problems of strategic inflexibility. Bresser (1984) and Bresser and 377 Harl (1986) argued that organizations adopting collective strategies limit their strategic flexibility because, by agreeing to abstain from certain types of competitive behaviors such as price competition, they curtail their repertoire of available strategic tools. When considering the problem of uncontrolled information disclosure, losses in strategic flexibility resulting from a collective strategy may be even more encompassing. If the managements of organizations realize that the communication links provided by a collective strategy allow for an uncontrolled disclosure of strategic plans, they may be reluctant to pursue competitive strategies even in those business areas that are not subject to a collective agreement. PROCESSES IMPAIRING SECRECY Since potential combinations between competitive and collective strategies face the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure resulting from collective strategy links, they raise the issue of strategic fit (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). In order to minimize problems of uncontrolled information disclosure it is necessary to obtain some degree of compatability among possible strategy combinations. Attaining a fit between competitive and collective strategies requires first of all an appreciation of the processes that may impair an organizations desire to maintain the secrecy of its strategic plans. Table 2 summarizes for each type of collective strategy the particular processes that may lead to an impairment of secrecy, and it assesses the risk of uncontrolled disclosure of information. If collective lobbying leads to protective regulation the activities of regulators may impede competition (Pennings, 1981). Regulators often collect and disseminate a wealth of information about regulated industries. Through these information flows, regulators can allow competitors to forecast each others moves even in areas that are not subject to regulatory control. For example, Litwak and Rothman (1970) suggested that the Federal Communications Commission had provided the broadcasting networks with so much information about the broadcasting industry that the networks were able to anticipate their competitors behavior and, as a result, effective competition was not possible. The autonomy of 378 R. K. F. Bresser Table 2. Processes impairing secrecy and risk of uncontrolled disclosure by type of collective strategy Type of collective strategy Impairment of secrecy Risk of uncontrolled information disclosure Regulative legislation Contracting Mergers Joint ventures Interlocking directorates Trade associations Collusion and industry leadership Regulators collecting and disseminating information Contracts contingent on information Dissatisfied employees (defectors) Mediation of information Passing on of information due to multiple and indirect communication links Distribution of trade statistics Informal communication High Low Low Intermediate High Intermediate Low regulatory agencies in their information-gathering activities results in high risk of uncontrolled disclosure. Contracting refers to the negotiation of formal agreements among organizations (Thompson, 1967). In general, the information exchanged as a result of contractual negotiations will be focused, avoiding the disclosure of sensitive competitive aspects. However, some contracts such as bank loans may require that focal organizations provide extensive information about their competitive plans. This raises the possibility that information leaks within the information-seeking institution will be exploited by a focal organizations competitors. Since he disclosure of sensitive information in the context of contractual negotiations is not very common, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure can be considered low. Mergers and joint ventures are two special forms of contracting. Mergers, with the exception of hostile takeovers, are contracts through which two or more organizations comneunder common control. Joint ventures can be viewed as partial mergers which preserve the autonomy of the organizatio ns involved. Often mergers are accompanied by a host of administrative problems (Lubatkin, 1983). For example, departments and operations must be consolidated and initial inequities in compensation have to be resolved. If such administrative problems remain unresolved, inefficiencies will result, as well as employee dissatisfaction and turnover. The merger between Kennecott Corp. and Carborundum Co. is a case in point (Business Week, 1983). The two companies managements quarreled over administrative problems and, after a short period of infighting, most Carborundum executives jumped ship. There is danger that defecting executives may disclose strategically sensitive information concerning the merging firms when they join other organizations within the same industry. However, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure resulting from a merger is considered low. This is because senior executives leaving merging firms often receive generous severance compensation for which they promise continued confidentiality. Additionally, since merging firms often develop new strategic concepts, the information available to departing executives is likely to be quickly obsolete. If a collective strategy is based on a joint venture the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is considered to be at intermediate levels. Although the cooperation provided by a joint venture is restricted to specific, mutual business problems, the regularity and longevity of interactions typical of a joint venture may allow participating firms to improve their intelligence about each others competitive strategies. For example, firm representatives engaged in joint ventures can develop friendship ties where they feel free to discuss more general strategic issues. During such discussions sensitive information may be disclosed inadvertently. Interlocking directorates result from organizational co-optation activities whereby organizations appoint external representatives to their Matching Collective and Comnpetitive Strategies boards of directors. Since many directors sit on the boards of two or more companies (Bunting and Barbour, 1971), interlocking directorates emerge which can be used as instruments for managing interdependence and uncertainty by encouiraging cooperation and the formation of collective strategies (Aldrich, 1979; Pennings, 1980, 1981). However, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is high because the scope and the intensity of intra-industry communication facilitated by direct and indirect interlocks is beyond the control of individual organizations. Therefore, it is very difficult for individual organizations to conceal their competitive strategies when their directors have membership in a network of interlocking directorates. Trade associations provide member organizations with special services at low costs. For instance, they may distribute trade statistics, provide credit references on customers, offer legal and technical advice, or help collect bills (Olson, 1965). In addition, associations can aid in removing decision-making uncertainty resulting from interdependence. Since trade statistics generally include prices quoted in recent sales transactions as well as cost developments, member organizations have the opportunity to coordinate their market behavior and thus implement a collective strategy (Scherer, 1980). The dissemination of statistical information provided by trade associations may impair the desire of focal organizations to maintain secrecy their competitive strategies. While firms regiarding are often in favor of price and cost reporting activities, they run the risk that other sensitive information concerning their competitive strategies may also be disclosed. Trade associations sometimes analyze industry trends regarding product development or marketing strategies, and thus allow competitors to anticipate each others moves. A focal organization may have little control over the kind of information being disseminated because trade associations are often dominated by a few powerful organizations. Olson (1965) described the National Association of Manufacturers as largely financed and controlled by a few big corporations, although the association had several thousand members. There is the possibility that such domination leads to activities favoring a handful of member organizations rather than the majority. In addition, the selective services provided by 379 ssociations function as subtle forms of coercion restricting a firms flexibility. The exclusivity and low costs of legal, financial or other services operate as strong incentives for joining or remaining within an association even if a focal organization disagrees with some association activities. Thus, when using trade association activities to enforce a collective strategy, a moderate risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is likely. The term co llusion denotes express agreements, open or secret, that have the purpose of restricting competition. Most collusive agreements are outlawed in the United States because they encourage monopolistic pricing behavior. Nevertheless, collusive practices are widespread and often effective means of managing interdependence. Their attraction is associated with their high degree of informality which makes it difficult for outsiders to detect conspiratorial agreements (Khandwalla, 1981). Industry leadership is a tacit version of collusion based on imitation. It describes a situation where a specific firm is the acknowledged leader in setting prices, and other firms follow. As opposed to collusive agreements, industry leadership has the advantage of not being contrary to the antitrust laws. It is considered legal as long as it is grounded on voluntary imitation rather than explicit communication (White, 1981). Since collective strategies mediated by collusive agreements are based on informal communication and, in the case of industry leadership, on imitation, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is low. Colluding firms will share information only in areas where they wish to cooperate while maintaining the secrecy of their competitive plans. The above risk assessments imply that uncontrolled information disclosure is always damaging for the success of a focal organizations competitive plans. While the dynamics of oligopolistic markets would tend to support this assumption (Scherer, 1980), the degree of damage resulting from uncontrolled disclosure can be viewed as contingent upon several situational variables. Specifically, four situational variables appear important: breadth of information disclosure, quality of information disclosure, asymmetry in interdependence, and event control. These situational variables can facilitate the combination of a high-risk collective strategy with competitive strategies, and they can make the adoption of a 380 Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies dimensions. This is relevant for evaluating strategy combinations because an uncontrolled disclosure of information is less troublesome if competitors are unable to capitalize on the information due to their inability to respond rapidly to a focal organizations competitive moves. Table 3 presents a typology of possible combinations between competitive and collective strategies, and evaluates their feasibility from the perspective of individual firms. Generally, a strategy combination is considered feasible if (1) the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is low. Feasibility evaluations also take into account (2) the degree of competitor responsiveness typical for a competitive dimension, and (3) typical characteristics of specific collective strategies, namely the number of participants involved and the stability of an agreement. Considering typical characteristics of collective strategies is important because such characteristics can modify feasibility ratings that are based on assessments of the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure and the level of competitor responsiveness. Situational variables, described above, may mediate the damage resulting from uncontrolled information disclosure but do not lend themselves to generalizations and therefore are excluded from considerations leading to the typology shown in Table 3. However, in using the typology, situational variables will have to be taken into account, as is shown in the implications section. In Table 3 the competitive dimensions pricing, advertising and promotion, and product innovation are distinguished for each of the seven collective strategies summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Within each of these competitive dimensions, organizations can relate to each other by using either competitive or collective strategies. Thus, six strategy combinations are possible for each type of collective strategy, leading to a total of 42 combinations presented in Table 3. I Since only two values are possible within each competitive dimension, and since the extreme cases (competitive or collective strategies across all competitive dimensions) are irrelevant as they do not represent combinations of collective and competitive strategies, the total number of strategy combinations C for each type of collective strategy can be calculated by collective strategy with low or moderate risks of uncontrolled disclosure problematic. For example, the potential damage resulting from uncontrolled disclosure may be considered low, and thus can facilitate the adoption of a collective strategy where the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is high, when the competitive information that could be disclosed is not very encompassing (breadth of information disclosure), or of questionable quality regarding its reliability and/or timeliness (Adams, 1976; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Similarly, if interdependence is asymmetric, with some organizations being in a relatively powerful competitive position (e. . due to their size), uncontrolled information disclosure may not be very troublesome for these powerful organizations because they know that other competitors lack the resources to exploit the disclosed information (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Likewise, damage may be low and containable, if organizations can rapidly and effectively counteract events leading to uncontrolled information disclosure, for example, by changing perso nnel or the content of a collective strategy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Implications for evaluating the feasibility of strategy combinations resulting from the role of situational variables are discussed below. COMBINATIONS OF COMPETITIVE AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES Apart from an understanding of how collective strategies can lead to uncontrolled information disclosure, an assessment of what types of combinations between competitive and collective strategies are feasible requires that different competitive strategies also be distinguished. Three distinguishing dimensions of competitive strategies are pricing, advertising and promotion, and product innovation (Khandwalla, 1981). These dimensions can be classified according to their degree of competitor responsiveness (Ansoff, 1984). The term competitor responsiveness refers to the speed with which competitors can respond to variations in competitive conditions. While price cuts usually can be matched instantly, it takes much longer to organize retaliations to a heavy advertising campaign, and even longer to respond to product innovations (Khandwalla, 1981; Scherer, 1980). Thus competitor responsiveness decreases along these three competitive C = (21- 2) where d is the number of competitive dimensions considered. For d=-3 dimensions the number of possible strategy combinations is C=6. R. K. F. Bresser Table 3. Combinations of competitive and collective strategies and their feasibility Dimensions of competition Types of strategy Pricing combinations 1. 1 1. 2 1. 3 1. 4 1. 5 1. 6 2. 1 2. 2 2. 3 2. 4 2. 5 2. 6 3. 1 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5 3. 6 4. 1 4. 2 4. 3 4. 4 4. 5 4. 6 5. 1 5. 2 5. 3 5. 4 5. 5 5. 6 6. 1 6. 2 6. 3 6. 4 6. 5 6. 6 7. 1 7. 2 7. 3 7. 4 7. 5 7. IL Competition Regulation Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Contracting Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Merger Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Joint Venture Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Interlocks Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Trade Association Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Collusion/IL Collusion/IL Co mpetition Collusion/IL Competition Advertising and promotion Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Regulation Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Contracting Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Merger Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Joint Venture Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Interlocks Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Trade Association Collusion/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Competition Collusion/IL 381 Product innovation Regulation Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Contracting Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Merger Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Joint Venture Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Interlocks Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Trade Association Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Collusion/IL Collusion/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Competition Feasibility of strategy combination Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate High High High High High High High High High High High Intermediate Intermediate High High High High Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Industryleadership The first group of (six) strategy combinations uses competition in one or two competitive dimensions in conjunction with regulation as the basis for enforcing a collective strategy. The feasibility of all six combinations is rated either at low or intermediate levels. The first two combinations (1. 1 and 1. 2) have a low feasibility rating. If organizations use regulation to harmonize their promotional and product innovation activities, and have competitive flexibility in the area of pricing (combination 1. 1), their chances of competing successfully are slim. This is because 382 R. K. F. Bresser an industry may remain intense. In fact, often firms merge to obtain strategic advantages in the areas of price competition, promotion or product innovation wlhich may increase rather than decrease competitive interactions. When joint ventures serve as mechanisms to enforce collective strategies, feasibility ratings for strategy combinations are similarly favorable. This form of collective strategizing also tends to involve only a few organizations, allowing for competition within a particular area in spite of joint venture activity. fHowever, joint ventures carry a higher risk of uncontrolled information disclosure than contracting or mergers. Thus cautious feasibility evaluations seem appropriate when a focal organization engages in joint ventures in more than one comnpetitivearea, and when the only competitive dimension not subject to collective coordination is characterized by relatively high levels of competitor responsiveness (combinations 4. 1 and 4. 2). In these situations the relatively high number of information links among firms participating in several joint ventures multiplies the risk and potential damage of uncontrolled disclosure. If organizations choose interlocking directorates to coordinate intra-industry activity, they constantly run a high risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. Co-opted directors may intentionally or inadvertently, directly or indirectly, pass on sensitive information to a focal organizations competitors. Thus, relying on interlocks to enforce collective strategies while simultaneously attempting to maintain some competitive flexibility does not appear feasible. The predominant feasibility rating assigned to the group of strategy combinations using trade associations as a means to develop collective strategies is intermediate. Although experience demonstrates that the coordination provided by trade associations mostly does not go beyond price and cost reporting (Scherer, 1980), the possibility of trade associations collecting and reporting other sensitive information is always acute. Often individual organizations cannot oppose such uncontrolled reporting of industry developments, especially if the association is dominated by a few powerful corporations. If trade associations do not engage in price reporting, but are used to develop collective strategies in the areas of advertising and promotion, and product innovation (combination 6. 1), a low uick competitor responsiveness can be expected with respect to the pricing dimension, and regulators are likely to disclose sensitive information concerning advertising and innovations. A similar argu ment applies to combination 1. 2, where competitive conditions exist only with regard to advertising and promotion, a dimension characterized by intermediate levels of competitor responsiveness. Since competitors usually need considerable time to respond to product innovations, combination 1. 3 (with regulation in the other two dimensions) is not quite as problematic as the first two combinations. However, the distinct possibility of uncontrolled information disclosure through regulator activities makes combination 1. 3 feasible only at an intermediate level. Combinations 1. 4 through 1. allow for competition in at least two dimensions. While these combinations provide organizations with a larger arsenal of competitive tools than the first three combinations, they also are considered feasible only at intermediate levels because of the risk of uncontrolled disclosure through regulators. The feasibility of strategy combinations involving contracting as a form of collective strategizin g generally is considered high because the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure tends to be low. In addition, often (and in contrast to regulation) only few organizations participate in a particular contractual agreement, thus limiting the extent to which competition is constrained. If, within an industry of say eight oligopolists, three contract to standardize product designs, competition with the remaining five oligopolists in the area of product innovations is still possible and likely. The only strategy combination where a less favorable (intermediate) feasibility rating is assigned is combination 2. 1. If extensive contracting in the areas of advertising/promotion and product innovation has considerably lowered the participating firms strategic flexibility, relying on price competition as the sole competitive tool does not appear sensible. Price competition is likely to face a high degree of competitor responsiveness. The third group of strategy combinations, using merger activity to realize collective strategies, has high feasibility ratings throughout. The risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is low, and the number of firms involved in a merger is usually quite small, so that competition within Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies feasibility rating seems appropriate. Again, in this situation firms would maintain competition only in an area where high competitor responsiveness is likely. Combinations of competitive and collective strategies using the various forms of collusion and industry leadership are not as problem-free as the risk evaluation in Table 2 might suggest. Although collusive agreements are not burdened with the problem of uncontrolled information disclosure, their combination with competitive strategies appears feasible at an intermediate level at best. Since collusive agreements are informal and difficult to enforce, individual firmns have a strong incentive to chisel-that is to increase their profits by secretly deviating from the agreement (Stigler, 1964). Secret deviations cannot be concealed for long periods of time, and frequently result in collusive conspiracies breaking down and touching off bitter rivalries such as price wars (Scherer, 1980; Weiss, 1961). It is likely that the tendency of collusive agreements towards breakdown will be aggravated if colluding organizations decide to compete in some competitive areas rather than displaying gentlemanly, non-competitive behavior across all competitive dimensions. A firms successful competitive behavior in one area will encourage less successful firms to chisel in other areas that are subject to collusive coordination. Thus combinations of competitive and collective strategies can be expected to be volatile when collusion serves as a means for enforcing collective strategies. This volatility results from the particular characteristics of collusive agreements, and exists regardless of the risk for uncontrolled information disclosure or the level of competitor responsiveness. 383 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS This paper extends the literature advocating the development of voluntary collective strategies as means to manage environmental turbulence and interdependence (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986). It assesses the possibilities of combining competitive with collective strategies from the perspective of individual organizations. Such combinations may be problematic because an organizations ability to maintain the secrecy of competitive strategic plans may be jeopardized by information links established through different forms of collective strategy (Fornbrun and Astley, 1983a; Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). After discussing how collective strategies may lead to an uncontrolled disclosure of strategically sensitive information, combinations of competitive and collective strategies are classified according to their varying degrees of feasibility. A comparison of the ratings presented in Tables 2 and 3 makes apparent that the feasibility of strategy combination tends to be inversely related to the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. If the risk and the feasibility ratings are expressed numerically with the values of low equaling 1, intermediate equaling 2, and high equaling 3, a correlation coefficient can be calculated on the basis of all 42 strategy combinations. The resulting coefficient is r = -0. 70, indicating that within the present classification scheme about 50 percent of the variance in feasibility evaluations is accounted for by the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. However, high risks of uncontrolled disclosure do not generally lead to low feasibility ratings, and low risks do not necessarily imply high feasibility scores , as is demonstrated by the combinations involving collective strategies based on regulation and collusion respectively. The unexplained variation in feasibility ratings suggests additional factors are important in assessing the feasibility of strategy combinations, notably the degree of competitor responsiveness and the particular characteristics of the type of collective strategy employed. Further variation in feasibility ratings can be expected when situational variables such as breadth and quality of information disclosure, asymmetry in interdependence, and event control are considered (Adams, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). This is so because these situational variables can contain or amplify the potential damage resulting from uncontrolled infornmationdisclosure. While situational variables were not considered in the development of this papers typology of strategy combinations, they have implications both for research and managerial decision-making that can originate from the typological classification given in Table 3. The existence of situational variables highlights a feature common to all typologies or organi- 384 R. K. F. Bresser information disclosure is of little relevance? 7. How rapidly and effectively can events of uncontrolled information disclosure be counteracted? Answers to these and similar questions can help executives to apply the information provided by Table 3 situationally before adopting a specific combination of collective and competitive strategies. From this process the selection of compatible strategies should result. This papers discussion has concentrated on oligopolistic markets because, typically, in such markets competitors are aware of their mutual interdependence, have incomplete control of each others moves, and yet the success of each oligopolists strategic intentions depends considerably on the activities chosen by other competitors (Pennings, 1981). Obviously, within such a context, the damage resulting from an uncontrolled disclosure of sensitive information is potentially high. While the theory of oligopoly has been developed mainly for domestic, nondiversified enterprise (Stigler, 1964), the issues and ideas discussed in this paper can also be of relevance to multinational and diversified corporations. Due to the dominance of oligopolies, both multinational and diversified firms will often find themselves operating in different national or regional oligopolies. Additionally, managing a match between collective and competitive strategies may be more difficult in interindustry and international arenas than in intraindustry environments because the number of interdependent segments representing a particular coporations domain is larger and more complex (Bresser and Harl, 1986; Hawkins and Walter, 1981). Thus, anticipating factors such as the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure and the potential damage resulting from such disclosure may be even more important for multinational and diversified firms than for domestic oligopolists. zational phenomena. Classifications of the type developed in Table 3 are ideal types, based on generalizations derived from common knowledge and common sense (Blau and Scott, 1962; Pugh, Hickson and Hinings, 1969). However, the strategy combinations distinguished represent 42 separate hypotheses regarding the opportunities and risks organizations might encounter when utilizing competitive and collective strategies side by side. The accuracy of any particular feasibility evaluation is an empirical question open to resolution through historical research, where the mediating role of situational variables has to be included in the research design. From a managerial point of view a typology of strategy combinations with varying levels of feasibility can aid in strategic decision-making. The strategic options evaluated in Table 3 can serve as a guide to managers considering a particular strategy combination. In attempting to extrapolate easibility evaluations, decisionmakers would have to assess whether the variables leading to the feasibility ratings shown in Table 3 are of the assumed magnitude, and to what extent deviations would lead to different feasibility assessments. In addition, decision-mak ers would have to evaluate the extent to which situational variables require changes in feasibility ratings. For example, a firm intending to implement a strategy mix similar to combination 4. 3 would have to consider the following questions before deciding whether the feasibility of such a combination is high: 1. Is the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure resulting from the planned joint venture activity really at moderate levels, and how can it be contained? 2. Is there really a low degree of competitor responsiveness to product innovations within this industry? 3. Is competitive flexibility in pricing and promotional strategies maintained in spite of joint venture activity within these competitive dimensions? 4. How encompassing is the information that could get disclosed? 5. How reliable and timely is the information that competitors could obtain? 6. 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